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Responsible Debt Relief: An Algorithmic
Assessment of Household Debt
Capacity and Repayment Capability
Since the early 1990s, the growth of U.S. household debt in general and
consumer credit card debt in particular has soared to unprecedented
levels—from an aggregate total of less than $4.0 trillion in 1990 to
over $13 trillion in 2008.1 During this period, the average American
household dramatically increased its home mortgage debt, from almost
$2.5 trillion in 1990 to nearly $10.5 trillion today.2 Similarly, consumer
“revolving” or
credit card debt
This research brief introduces a new idea called Responsible Debt Relief. If
quadrupled from
you are interested in piloting this service, please contact Professor Robert
$239 billion (B)
Manning for details at rmanning@saunders.rit.edu.
to about $950B
today.3 Moreover,
the growth of U.S. credit card debt is substantially underreported by the
oﬃcial U.S. Federal Reserve statistics, due to the tremendous volume
of mortgage reﬁnancings that were transacted between 2001 and 2005.
At least $350B in consumer credit card debt was paid oﬀ through
mortgage reﬁnancings, home equity loans, and cash proceeds from
the sale of real estate over this ﬁve-year period.4 This is consistent with
the ﬁndings of Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy, who report that
“equity extraction was used to repay an average of about $50 billion of
nonmortgage consumer debt between 1991 to 2005, about 3% of the
outstanding balance of that debt at the beginning of the year.” Signiﬁcantly, it averaged only $25.2B per year prior to 2001 (1991–2000) and
then $98.9B over the next ﬁve years (2001–2005).5
This is especially important, since many American families have
become dependent on the equity in their homes to ﬁnance their

1

Data are for the first quarter of 2008. U.S. Department of Commerce, Flow of Funds, “Debt Outstanding by Sector,” December 2007, p. 8.
For a discussion of consumer debt statistics and measurement issues, see Robert D. Manning, Credit Card Nation: The Consequences of
America’s Addiction to Credit (New York: Basic Books, 2000), Chapter 1. See also Robert D. Manning, “Consumer Credit in An Age of Affluence:
The Impact of Financial Services De-regulation,” expert testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services hearing on “Giving Consumers Credit: How Is the Credit Card Industry Treating Its Customers?” Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
and Consumer Credit, Washington, DC, November 2001 (at www.creditcardnation.com/reports.html). Also see “Banking Deregulation and
the Consumer Lending Revolution: What Happened to Consumer Rights?” American Bankruptcy Law Journal (forthcoming, fall 2008).
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Data are for the first quarter of 2008. U.S. Department of Commerce, Flow of Funds, “Debt Outstanding by Sector,” December 2007, p. 8.
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For data on consumer revolving and nonrevolving debt, see U.S. Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Consumer Credit (April 2008),
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/Current/.
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See Robert D. Manning, “Examining the Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit Card Industry and Their Impact on
Consumers,” expert testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Washington, DC, January 2007.
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Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy, “Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes,” working paper in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS), U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC, 2007, pp. 9–10.
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household expenses and are now facing rising credit card balances
with increasing interest rates. This is illustrated by historical home
equity trends in the United States. Between 1960 and the 1982–1983
recession, home equity remained relatively stable at about 70%. Over
the next decade, home equity declined sharply to about 60% in 1993
and has dropped to a historic low of from nearly 57% in 2001 to
almost 48% in the ﬁrst quarter of 2008.6 And, with nearly two million
variable-rate home mortgages scheduled to “reset” to higher interest
rates over the next two years and an impending “consumer-led” recession by summer 2008 that will precipitate the loss of tens of thousands
of jobs,7 credit-strapped and debt-burdened households could trigger
record levels of loan defaults and consumer bankruptcy ﬁlings over the
next two to three years as the “double ﬁnancial bubble” implodes.8
In 2005, the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) was viewed by the creditor and
debt collection industries as a long-awaited statutory tool for curbing
the discharge of billions of dollars of unsecured consumer debts. This
creditor-friendly legislation, with mandatory consumer counseling
provisions to discourage bankruptcy ﬁlings and tougher income-based
“means-testing” provisions to reduce the number of Chapter 7 consumer debt liquidation petitions, was viewed as the “hard rock” that
would complement the litigatory “hammer” of traditional adversarial
debt collection policies. Although consumer bankruptcy rates fell
sharply—from 1.5 million in 2005 to almost 600,000 in 2006 with
an increase in Chapter 13 ﬁlings—the inherent problems of the new
bankruptcy reform statutes have not been able to curb the growth of
consumer bankruptcy ﬁlings in the post-housing boom period.9 In fact,
in 2007 bankruptcy ﬁlings jumped 40% to more than 850,000 (with
Chapter 7 ﬁlings falling to 61%) and is expected to exceed one million
in 2008; more than 226,000 consumers ﬁled bankruptcy during the

6

Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy, “Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes,” working paper in the Finance and Economics Discussion Series (FEDS), U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC, 2007, p. 27. See U.S. Federal Reserve data for housing
mortgage debt and home equity in the first quarter of 2008. This figure is expected to drop even more in 2008, with the notable
exception that it will be due to declining home values rather than household equity extraction.

7

Robert D. Manning, U.S. Consumer Sentiment and Household Consumption: Assessing the Wealth Effect and the Prospect of a
Consumer-Led Recession, final report, submitted to Fidelity International, November 2007.

8

Robert D. Manning, “Banking Deregulation and the Consumer Lending Revolution: What Happened to Consumer Rights?” American
Bankruptcy Law Journal (forthcoming, fall 2008). The “double financial bubble” refers to the irrational exuberance of the housing
bubble of 2001–2005, which unrealistically increased lenders’ perception of consumer debt capacity as traditionally measured by
household income: (1) home mortgage debt and (2) credit card debt. As banks more aggressively marketed consumer credit cards
in the early and mid-2000s, the underwriting assumption was that consumers’ greater home equity wealth would miraculously
absorb rising revolving debt. By essentially disconnecting consumer debt capacity from household income, the only way for American
families to avoid financial insolvency was to sell their homes and either rent or “trade down” to pay off their unprecedentedly high
consumer debts. For those households that did not recognize that the U.S. Federal Reserve’s low-interest-rate economic policy had
essentially suspended the macroeconomic laws of gravity between 2001 and 2005, the bursting of the double financial bubble in
2006 and 2007 entailed the disastrous reality of enormous mortgage payments and escalating credit card debts.

9

See the special issue of the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, fall 2008.
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ﬁrst quarter of 2008.10 Furthermore, Chapter 13 bankruptcy is becoming the option of last resort for many homeowners who are ﬁnding
the Federal Bankruptcy Court to be a feasible strategy for retaining
their homes. This is especially likely if falling home values render home
equity loans as unsecured liabilities, and lenders can be encouraged to
consider mortgage loan modiﬁcations instead of foreclosure. Signiﬁcantly, federal bankruptcy judges cannot impose a lower interest rate
or reduce the outstanding balance of secured loans such as residential
mortgages. This is especially important to households whose home
mortgages have been “repackaged” and sold into asset-backed, securitized trusts where investors may not be interested in negotiating loan
modiﬁcations.
The fundamental problem with the 2005 BAPCPA statutes is that
they do not reﬂect the contemporary reality of the much less stringent
lending and underwriting policies of the consumer ﬁnancial services
industry, which are implicitly based on the rising home equity wealth
of American households. That is, current bankruptcy law preserves
the historic binary of repaying all or none of outstanding consumer
debts—based on changing societal deﬁnitions of worthy versus unworthy conditions for debt forgiveness11—without modifying current
statistical models of consumer debt capacity and repayment capability.
The result is a rapidly increasing bulge of “near-bankrupt”—middleclass households that are having diﬃculty servicing their unsecured
debt due to rising ﬁnance charges on their credit cards (which increases
minimum payments) and/or adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs).12 At
present, these heavily indebted families are less likely to report experiencing ﬁnancial distress due to traditional factors such as job loss,
medical expenses, and family crises. Indeed, as long as the robust housing market oﬀered nearly unrestricted lines of credit in the mid-2000s,
their ﬁnancial diﬃculties were obscured by mortgage reﬁnancings,
home equity extraction, and debt consolidation loans.13
Today, the near-bankrupt, which include dual-income households,
are facing a credit crunch that is forcing them to consider various
debt management, less-than-full-balance payoﬀ, and bankruptcy
10 The most recent consumer bankruptcy statistics are available at the U.S. Federal Bankruptcy Court Web site, www.uscourts.gov/
Press_Releases/2008/BankruptcyFilings.cfm.
11 See for example, Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay L. Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and Consumer
Credit in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay L. Westbrook, The Fragile
Middle Class: Americans in Debt (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000); and Elizabeth Warren and Jay L. Westbrook, The Law of
Debtors and Creditors (Gaithersburg, NY: Aspen Law & Business Press, 2001).
12 For a discussion of the expansion of household consumer debt capacity as “stretched” by the aggressive marketing of bank credit
cards in the 1990s, see Lawrence Asubel, “Credit Card Defaults, Profits, and Bankruptcy,” American Bankruptcy Law Journal, Spring
1997, pp. 249–270. The late 1990s was the first time soaring consumer bankruptcy rates were associated with declining rates of
unemployment.
13 See Robert D. Manning, “Banking Deregulation and the Consumer Lending Revolution: What Happened to Consumer Rights?” American Bankruptcy Law Journal (forthcoming, fall 2008).
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(Chapter 7 or 13) options.14 The problem is exacerbated by resetting ARMs, rising loan to value (LTVs) of their mortgages (precluding new home equity loans), escalating ﬁnance rates on credit
cards, the rising cost of living, and a sharply declining housing
market for those seeking to pay oﬀ their consumer debts following
the sale of their homes. Signiﬁcantly, the overwhelming majority
of these families intend to repay their debts to the best of their
abilities while struggling with the unexpected changes in the U.S.
economy and consumer lending practices.15
Over the next two years many households will increase their credit card
balances in order to service their home mortgages. Others will enroll in
debt management programs and eventually drop out due to inevitable
ﬁnancial exigencies. Some households that do not qualify for an accredited Consumer Credit Counseling Service (CCCS) program will enroll
in nefarious debt settlement programs, while the rest will simply give
up by ﬁling for consumer bankruptcy in a last-gasp eﬀort to save their
homes or to seek protection from the stress of debt collection actions.
Others will default on their loans and seek informal ﬁnancial relief outside a negotiated partial payment or debt liquidation program; many
cannot even aﬀord the requisite fees to ﬁle for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Hence, consumer demand is intensifying for a programmatic solution
to the “all or nothing” debt repayment binary of CCCS programs (full
payment) and Chapter 7 bankruptcy (full debt discharge).16
The recent emergence and growth of heavily indebted near-bankrupt
households (with credit card debts commonly in the $40,000–$60,000
range) underscores the need for a partial payment plan that balances
14 The conceptualization and discussion of the emergence of the financially overindebted near-bankrupt or intermediate group (between
financially insolvent bankruptcy filers and financially encumbered households in debt management [CCCS] programs) was presented
by Robert D. Manning, expert testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, “Examining the
Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit Card Industry and Their Impact on Consumers,” Washington, DC, January
2007; and expert testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs hearing on “Current Legal and
Regulatory Requirements and Industry Practices for Card Issuers with Respect to Consumer Disclosures and Marketing Efforts,”
Washington, DC, May 2005, available at www.creditcardnation.com/reports.html.
15 This theme of the worthy versus unworthy debtor highlights the tension between contending paradigms of individual responsibility and institutional irresponsibility. For instance, Juliet Schor, The Overspent America: Why We Want What We Don’t Need (New York:
Harper, 1999) focuses on competitive and referential discretionary consumption, while Elizabeth Warren and Amelia Warren Tyagi,
The Two Income Trap (New York: Basic Books, 2003) emphasize the rise of economic inequality and the soaring cost of living for
middle-class Americans. Clearly, the increase in social inequality that began in the early-1990s is highly correlated with rising levels
of household consumer debt, as discussed in Robert D. Manning, Credit Card Nation: The Consequences of America’s Addiction to
Credit (New York: Basic Books, 2000) and “Banking Deregulation and the Consumer Lending Revolution: What Happened to Consumer
Rights?” American Bankruptcy Law Journal (forthcoming, fall 2008). As a result, the debate often devolves into contested views of
deterministic (increasing social inequality) versus free will (unrepentant consumption) economic behavioralism.
16 Debt settlement programs have temporarily responded to the household demand for less-than-full-balance payment programs.
The problem is that most debt settlement companies fall outside of various state consumer protection statutes and have become a
frequent target of regulatory “cease and desist” actions. Also, they have been plagued by rogue companies that have absconded with
client funds and/or have failed to protect their clients from debt collection litigation. And, especially germane to this paper, the partial
payment debt “settlement” proposals are not based on objective estimates of consumer repayment capability and thus have little
credibility from the perspective of lenders/debt collectors. Significantly, the new BAPCPA statutes offer Chapter 13 filers the option of
a negotiated 5-year repayment of 60% of outstanding unsecured debts (60-60 plan). However, it requires a negotiated plan with each
creditor and is not based on an empirically objective assessment of consumer debt repayment ability.
4

the interests of creditors and consumers without incurring costly debt
collection litigation or bankruptcy ﬁling fees. More speciﬁcally, a
means-tested program is needed for near-bankrupt consumers who
do not have suﬃcient resources to enter a CCCS debt management
program (repayment of approximately 120%–140% over ﬁve
Today, the near-bankrupt, which include dual-income
years) but possess enough cash
households, are facing a credit crunch that is forcing them
ﬂow to repay a portion of their
to consider various debt management, less-than-full-balance
unsecured debts, even though
payoﬀ, and bankruptcy (Chapter 7 or 13) options.
they could ﬁle for consumer
bankruptcy. The challenge and
complexity of formulating a fair and equitable less-than-full-balance
payment agreement are due to:
• The large number of diﬀerent creditors that are owed by individual households.
• Falling and uncertain value of residential property.
• Sharply rising interest rates on residential mortgages and delinquent credit cards.
• An escalating proportion of household income required for housing and transportation expenses.
• The lack of an objective, empirical algorithm that precisely estimates the repayment capability of consumers and that explicitly
recognizes diﬀerences in cost of living, household structure, and
after-tax income (itemized or non-itemized tax ﬁling).
Clearly, both creditors and consumers would beneﬁt from a negotiated repayment program that oﬀered near-bankrupt households the
option of repaying between 20% and 60% of their unsecured debts
over three years.

The Responsible Debt Relief
Algorithm: An Objective Grading
System for Identifying Appropriate
Debt Management Programs
The key to a successful Responsible Debt Relief (RDR) system is the
objective and statistically precise estimate of consumer debt capacity
and debt repayment capability.17 Unlike traditional debt collection
grading assessments, the Responsible Choice program is based on a
statistically complex and geographically robust empirical algorithm.18

17 Hope Financial USA is the exclusive licensee of the RDR algorithm, which is the cornerstone of the growing RDR network of CCCS
programs, Hope Responsible Choice plan affiliates, and consumer attorneys (Debtor’s Attorney Network).
18 The RDR algorithm is developed by Dr. Robert D. Manning, director of the Center for Consumer Financial Services, E. Philip Saunders
College of Business, Rochester Institute of Technology. The business decision-making software is licensed to Hope Financial USA
(www.hopefinancialusa.com).
5

This arithmetic estimate of household debt capacity and repayment capability generates two crucially important evaluative assessments: (1) classiﬁcation of individual consumers into appropriate
means-tested debt management/relief programs, and (2) speciﬁc
statistical estimates of consumers’ debt capacity and ability to repay
outstanding unsecured debt.
In essence, the ﬁrst component of the RDR assessment distinguishes
“worthy” from “unworthy” debtors by identifying those households
that qualify for a debt relief concession from lenders. The RDR algorithm classiﬁes consumers into three distinct grades, or categories, of
debt repayment capability:
• Low—Chapter 7 bankruptcy is the most realistic option (the
debtor can repay only a small fraction of their unsecured debts).
• Medium—The debtor’s estimated after-tax income qualiﬁes for
substantial debt concession (the debtor can repay 20%–60% of
unsecured debt over three years).
• High—The debtor can achieve full balance payment through
accredited CCCS debt management programs (ﬁve-year plans).
Hence, the RDR consumer debt capacity assessment algorithm serves
as a grading ﬁlter for creditors to identify: (a) consumers who cannot
repay a signiﬁcant proportion of their unsecured debts and should
ﬁle for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, in comparison to (b) consumers who
merit debt concessions through a less-than-full-balance payment plan
and (c) consumers who can repay their unsecured debts in full.
The second evaluation phase of the RDR algorithmic assessment is
a statistically precise, means-tested validation of an individual’s need
for a speciﬁc debt concession in order to avoid ﬁling for personal
bankruptcy. Although the RDR algorithm estimates—in percentage terms—the capability of all applicants to repay their unsecured
debts, only those consumers eligible to ﬁle for consumer bankruptcy
are considered for the Responsible Choice program. That is,
In sum, the RDR algorithm improves the eﬃciency of the
the most ﬁnancially distressed
overall system of consumer debt management programs by
consumers who cannot repay
guiding consumers to the plans that best match their ﬁnana minimum of 20% of their
cial situations.
unsecured debts do not qualify
for the Responsible Choice
program and are referred to consumer bankruptcy professionals.
Similarly, consumers who are able to repay more than 60% of their
unsecured debts over three years are referred to INCHARGE—a
nationally respected and accredited CCCS program. Only those
consumers who can repay between 20% and 60% of their unsecured
debts over three years qualify for a consumer debt relief concession of

6

the Responsible Choice program following the conﬁrmation of their
ﬁnancial information.
In sum, the RDR algorithm improves the eﬃciency of the overall
system of consumer debt management programs by guiding consumers to the plans that best match their ﬁnancial situations (bankruptcy,
Responsible Choice, or CCCS) while oﬀering creditors the assurance
that borrowers will repay their outstanding debts to the best of their
ability. Furthermore, the Responsible Choice program complements
rather than competes with CCCS debt management programs by
only accepting clients who cannot satisfy the ﬁnancial requirements
of a full-balance payment plan. Similarly, the Responsible Choice
program does not accept consumers whose ﬁnancial situations would
be best served by discharging their unsecured debts through the
Federal Bankruptcy Court. Instead, the objective of the Responsible
Choice program is to foster cooperative relationships with accredited
CCCS companies and the Federal Bankruptcy Court so that consumers confronting unexpected ﬁnancial diﬃculties—such as rising ARM

CORE COMPONENTS OF THE RDR SCORING SYSTEM

The key empirical components of the RDR

dated by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court

algorithm are:

in the district where the consumer

•

Uses total household income rather
than individual earnings, which provides
a more precise estimate of household
debt capacity and ability to repay outstanding consumer loans and unsecured debts.

•

resides. The wide range in allowable
household budget expenses, which
is explicitly incorporated into the RDR
algorithm, underlies the different debt
repayment rates both within and across
states—even among households
with the same incomes and number

Specifies homeowner status and thus

of dependents. See Figure 6 in the

estimates the net cost of home owner-

appendix for comparison by household

ship after tax deductions for finance

income, size, and state of residence.

charges and property taxes. Also,
the algorithm adjusts for anticipated
increases in mortgage interest rates for
adjustable rate loans.
•

The RDR algorithmic scores are statistically
precise for the purpose of estimating—
in percentage terms—the net return to

Estimates after-tax monthly income

creditors over the three-year repayment

according to household structure

period. Consumers who qualify for the

(number of dependents) and tax filer

Responsible Choice program are required

status (itemized or non-itemized). This

to repay the amount specified by the RDR

includes state and local taxes.

algorithm in order to successfully complete

• Specifies locality-based cost-of-living

the program.

expenses (household budget) as man7

rates—can avoid bankruptcy and honor their debt obligations to the
best of their ability. Ultimately, Hope Financial will develop strong
working relationships with regional and national CCCS companies such as INCHARGE, as well as local bankruptcy professionals
through the Debtor’s Attorney Network (DAN), so consumers unable
to qualify for a full-payment debt management program will be
referred to the Responsible Choice program rather than bankruptcy.
Hope Financial refers consumers who do not qualify for the Responsible Choice program to accredited debt management programs or,
when appropriate, to bankruptcy professionals. See Figure 1.
As explained in the sidebar, the power of the RDR algorithmic
assessment of household debt capacity lies in its inclusion of total
household income, housing costs that distinguish renters from
homeowners, estimates of “net” after-tax monthly income for paying

Figure 1: Flow Chart of RDR Program: Consumer Referral, Debt Capacity Classiﬁcation, and
Program Participation
Financial
services referrals
Banks, credit unions, consumer
credit counseling

Mass media
Advertising, interviews,
industry reporting

Corporate
outreach
Conventions, seminars,
community summits

RDR algorithm
Responsible Debt Relief grading system

Consumer
bankruptcy

Partial balance
program

Full balance
program

Responsible Choice Plan®
Low cost
legal assistance
Creditor
noncompliance

HOPE Financial USA
Individual RDR debt repayment assessment

Financial literacy education
Newtonian Finances, Ltd.

Program completion
36 months
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Consumer
Credit
Counseling
Service

unsecured debts, tax ﬁling status (itemized versus non-itemized), and
locality-based cost-of-living expenses. Hence, the algorithm is an
eﬃcient estimator of consumer debt capacity across all states (e.g.,
it incorporates local tax obligations) and geographic localities (e.g.,
urban versus rural areas), household structures (e.g., single versus
married with dependents), locality-based household cost-of-living
schedules, employment status (e.g., retired, employed), and types
of household ﬁnancial loan obligations (e.g., mortgage, installment,
court-imposed, medical, revolving).

The Responsible Choice Plan: A
Win–Win for Lenders and Financially
Distressed Borrowers
The empirically objective RDR algorithmic assessment of household debt capacity assures creditors that consumers are recommended for debt relief concessions only if they qualify for
consumer bankruptcy and thus can only repay a maximum of 60%
of unsecured debt. If the RDR
algorithm estimates that the
For creditors, the precision of the RDR classiﬁcatory grading
consumer can pay a higher
system ensures that only the most worthy ﬁnancially disnet amount to creditors, then
tressed households are qualiﬁed for consumer debt relief.
the application is rejected and
the consumer is referred to an
accredited CCCS program. Signiﬁcantly, the algorithmic estimate
of the creditors’ concessions is designed to maximize the probability of completing the three-year repayment plan. Since the
Responsible Choice plan does not require any upfront or set-up
fees from the client, there is not an economic incentive to qualify
marginally eligible consumers for less than the full balance payoﬀ.
Additionally, the most ﬁnancially distressed consumers, those who
cannot repay at least 20% of their unsecured debts, are referred to
bankruptcy professionals. (Visit www.ﬁlene.org/publications/detail/
responsible-debt-relief for summation of RDR consumer debt
assessment.)
For creditors, the precision of the RDR classiﬁcatory grading system
ensures that only the most worthy ﬁnancially distressed households
are qualiﬁed for consumer debt relief. The Responsible Choice plan
speciﬁes, moreover, that the costs of administering the program
are paid by those who are fortunate enough to receive debt concessions. Hence, lenders/creditors do not incur any collection-related
expenses, which maximizes the net return on their delinquent
accounts. Indeed, the administrative costs associated with the
Responsible Choice plan, which includes a comprehensive ﬁnancial
planning/budgeting/counseling support network for all clients, are

9

the lowest of the existing less-than-full-balance payoﬀ programs. The
annual administrative costs of the Responsible Choice plan average approximately 5% of the total outstanding unsecured debt. For
clients at the low (20%) and high (60%) ends of the payoﬀ range,
depending on the total outstanding unsecured debt, the annual average is less than 5%; administrative expenses are capped at 33% of the
creditors’ payoﬀ, which is the norm in the debt collection industry.
Also, administrative maintenance fees are rebated to clients who successfully complete the Responsible Choice program.
The RDR algorithm speciﬁes a creditor repayment “bandwidth” for
qualiﬁcation in the Responsible Choice plan that ranges from 20%
to 60% of households’ unsecured debt. The lower repayment “ﬂoor”
is based on the probability of completing the three-year program as
well as the value of Chapter 13 consumer bankruptcy repayment
agreements that are sold on the secondary market (at approximately
18%–21% of face value). The upper limit “ceiling” is deﬁned by the
60-60 provision of BAPCPA, which oﬀers consumers the opportunity to negotiate a 60% repayment plan over 60 months. Unfortunately, if past performance is a reliable indicator of the probability
of success of this 60-60 program, it will not oﬀer much assistance
to either consumers or creditors; historically, less than one-fourth of
Chapter 13 ﬁlers successfully complete their reorganization plans.
A major problem is that these long repayment plans (ﬁve to seven
years) encounter unexpected and insurmountable problems such as
job loss, medical expenses, auto repairs, childcare costs, childbirth
related expenses, and family crises such as divorce. This explains the
comparably low success rate of full-balance payment CCCS programs that are based on similar ﬁve- to seven-year debt repayment
schedules.
In sum, the Responsible Choice plan oﬀers a realistic payment
option for bankruptcy-eligible households that do not qualify for
a debt management program oﬀered by an accredited CCCS company. For the near-bankrupt households with the most ﬁnancial
resources, only those that can pay a maximum of 75% of their
outstanding debt over three years (60% to creditors and 15% for
administrative costs) are eligible for the Responsible Choice plan.
This is considerably less than the typical 120%–140% payoﬀ of the
ﬁve- to seven-year CCCS debt management programs. As a result,
the Responsible Choice and CCCS programs do not overlap, since
the RDR assessment algorithm ensures that consumers are classiﬁed
and are referred to the debt repayment plan that is most appropriate
to their household ﬁnancial capacity. Hence, Responsible Choice and
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CCCS programs complement each other and will generate reciprocal
referrals in the goal of matching consumers with the most appropriate ﬁnancial management program. Furthermore, in situations where
resetting mortgage loan payments may force consumers to drop out
of CCCS debt management programs, they can be recommended
to the Responsible Choice plan rather than ﬁling for consumer
bankruptcy. Such cooperative relationships will oﬀer more beneﬁcial
assistance to consumers as well as increase the net payoﬀ to lenders/
creditors such as credit unions.

RDR and the Near-Bankrupt
The crucial advantage of an empirically objective RDR consumer
debt assessment algorithm is its ability to establish a transparent and
balanced framework for lenders/creditors and borrowers to negotiate
a realistic debt repayment plan that is based on a statistically precise
estimate of household ﬁnancial capacity across the United States.
This creates a win–win for creditors and consumers by increasThis creates a win–win for creditors and consumers by
ing the net repayment rate while
increasing the net repayment rate while enabling consumers
enabling consumers to avoid
to avoid enduring the pitfalls of ﬁling for bankruptcy.
enduring the pitfalls of ﬁling for
bankruptcy. Furthermore, the
RDR consumer debt assessment algorithm—with its ability to estimate the rising cost of ARMs in the assessment of household ﬁnancial capacity—will relieve downward pressure on the imploding U.S.
housing market by enabling consumers to negotiate debt concessions
that allow them to retain their homes. This is especially important
in the successful development of regional partnerships with nonproﬁt organizations that wish to incorporate the Responsible Choice
program into existing community development and empowerment
projects. The ﬁrst pilot grass roots RDR project is being conducted
in Cleveland, Ohio.
By reducing the need for creditor litigation, the RDR consumer debt
assessment algorithm will enhance net repayment rates to creditors
since it precisely estimates the maximum amount of consumer debt
that can be realistically repaid. In the process, the rigorous RDR
grading algorithm and more realistic three-year repayment schedule
of the Responsible Choice program ensure a much higher success
rate than Chapter 13 reorganization or CCCS debt management
plans. With strict program qualifying criteria and a shorter repayment schedule, lenders/creditors will beneﬁt from the RDR grading
algorithm and the Hope Financial administrative system by not
wasting resources on debtors who will eventually ﬁle for consumer

11

bankruptcy or can only repay a small proportion of their outstanding
consumer debt. As the ranks of the near-bankrupt continue to swell
along with soaring levels of unsecured debt, the objective algorithmic
estimate of consumer debt capacity will become an essential tool in
recalibrating the balance between proﬁtable consumer lending and
responsible consumer debt relief.
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Appendix

State Guidelines for
Household Exemptions
to Consumer Bankruptcy
In bankruptcy, debtors are allowed to keep certain itemized assets,
known as “exempt” assets. Exemptions, however, vary from state to
state. The U.S. Congress, in enacting the federal bankruptcy laws, speciﬁcally gives states the right to opt in or out of the federal exemptions.
Some states have opted to retain federal exemptions. Other states have
opted out, and instead apply their own state exemptions. The following states allow the use of the federal bankruptcy exemptions: Arkansas, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.
As a result, some states end up being more lenient toward creditors, while others tend to be more sympathetic to the debtors. For
instance, ﬁve states allow debtors to keep their homes no matter how
expensive or extravagant they are, whereas other states force the liquidation of property as an attempt to pay oﬀ the debts. Other variations include the types of debt that a debtor can discharge, although
many of these are federally mandated without exception.
According to the Federal Bankruptcy Law, a debtor can keep $475
per item in any household goods up to a total of $9,850; $1,225
in jewelry; $3,225 in motor
vehicle; $1,850 in tools of trade;
This section highlights bankruptcy rules for states with high
$9,850 in life insurance policy
levels of bankruptcy ﬁlings. We publish this information
with loan value, in accrued divito illustrate the complexity of bankruptcy rules across the
dends or interest; and $18,450
United States.
in personal injury compensation
payments. A “wild card” provision allows retaining $925 of any personal property. The homestead
exemption is limited to $20,200; unused portion of homestead up to
$10,125 may be applied to any property.
If the state has opted out of the bankruptcy exemptions, only the
exemptions found in state law can be used to protect assets in bankruptcy. The exemptions are based on the laws of the state that the
debtor lived in for the two years prior to ﬁling for bankruptcy. However, if the debtor has recently moved, the home state is considered
the state in which the debtor lived for the majority of the 180 days
preceding the last two years.
Appendix
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Under the new federal law, a debtor must have acquired a home
(or paid for a home with funds from the sale of another home in
the same state) within 40 months prior to ﬁling in order to claim
that state’s full homestead exemption. If a debtor does not meet this
residency requirement, the allowed homestead exemption is capped
at $125,000, even if the exemption for that state is higher.
Some debts cannot be discharged. For example, one cannot discharge
debts for:
• Most delinquent taxes.
• Child support.
• Alimony.
• Most student loans.
• Court ﬁnes and criminal restitution.
• Personal injury caused by driving drunk or under the inﬂuence of
drugs.

Means Testing
In order to determine the debtor’s eligibility for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the means test is used by the courts. The debtor
must enter income and expense information on the appropriate
bankruptcy means test form and then make calculations using the
entered information.

Median Family Income
The means test compares the debtor’s average income for the past
six months, annualized, to the median income for households of the
same size in the debtor’s state of residence. Median income information used for comparison purposes is available on the U.S. Census
Bureau Web site (www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/statemedfaminc.
html) and the U.S. Trustee Program Web site (www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/
bapcpa/20070201/bci_data/median_income_table.htm).
Figure 2 provides median family income data reproduced in a format
designed for ease of use in completing bankruptcy forms. For cases
ﬁled on or after April 1, 2007, add $6,900 for each individual in
excess of four.
If the debtor’s income is less than or equal to the state median
income, the debtor “passes” the means test and may ﬁle Chapter 7.
If the debtor’s income exceeds the state median income, a further
analysis is performed, looking at the debtor’s calculated ability to
fund a Chapter 13 plan. The debtor’s disposable income is calculated,
applying a mix of actual and standardized expenses to the debtor’s
previous average income.
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Figure 2: Median Family Income by Family Size
Family size
One earner

Two people

Three people

Four people*

California

State

$44,499

$59,086

$64,118

$72,996

New York

$42,896

$51,994

$62,815

$74,501

Utah

$42,244

$49,107

$54,948

$59,872

Texas

$34,418

$48,849

$51,678

$59,369

Florida

$37,985

$46,914

$52,648

$64,280

* Four or more household members.
Source: www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/bci_data/median_income_table.htm.

Some of the information needed to complete these calculations, such
as a debtor’s current monthly income, comes from the debtor’s own
personal records. However, other information needed to complete
the forms comes from the Census Bureau and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS).

National Standards for Allowable
Living Expenses
The IRS National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses are
available from the IRS Web site (www.irs.gov/businesses/small/
article/0,,id=104627,00.html) and the U.S. Trustee Program Web
site (www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/bci_data/national_
expense_standards.htm). The allowable living expenses include ﬁve
categories of necessary expenses: food, housekeeping supplies, apparel
and services, personal care products and services, and miscellaneous.
Allowances for food, clothing, and other items apply nationwide
except in Alaska and Hawaii, which have their own tables. Taxpayers
are allowed the total National Standards amount for their family size
and income level, without questioning amounts actually spent. If a
debtor is paying a mortgage or is paying a loan for a car or leasing it,
the expense that is for the actual debt is separated from the allowable expense, because the debt itself is not an actual necessary living
expense.

Figure 3: National Standards for Allowable Living Expenses
Gross income
Less than
$833

$833–
$1,249

$1,250–
$1,666

$1,667–
$2,499

One person

$367

$409

$461

Two persons

$578

$595

$627

Three persons

$802

$808

$812

$819

Four or more
persons

$856

$890

$936

$941

Family size

$2,500–
$3,333

$3,334–
$4,166

$4,167–
$5,833

$5,834 and
over

$498

$556

$621

$703

$916

$744

$825

$825

$904

$1,306

$924

$926

$1,017

$1,368

$1,042

$1,063

$1,203

$1,546

Source: www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/bci_data/national_expense_standards.htm.
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Figure 3 shows the total of the ﬁve necessary expenses according to
the debtor’s family size and income level. A qualifying debtor can
claim additional food and clothing expense (“apparel and services”) if the debtor’s average monthly food and clothing expense
exceeds the combined allowances for those two subcategories, not
to exceed 5%.

Local Standards
The local standards for estimating locality-based standard of living are published by the IRS and consist of two primary expense
categories: (1) transportation and (2) housing and utilities. The
ﬁrst factor used in the bankruptcy means test is transportation
expenses. This information is available on the IRS Web site (www.
irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=104623,00.html). It consists
of nationwide ﬁgures for monthly loan or lease payments referred
to as ownership costs, and additional amounts for monthly operating costs broken down by census region and metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The ownership cost allowable is the same for all
MSAs—$471 for the ﬁrst car and $332 for the second car. The
operating cost and the cost of public transportation vary by state.

Figure 4: Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation for
Selected Regions
Region

No car

One car

Two cars

Los Angeles

$284

$897

$1,311

New York

$313

$873

$1,287

Denver

$312

$809

$1,223

Houston

$287

$809

$1,223

Tampa

$264

$724

$1,139

Source: www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/meanstesting.htm.

To calculate the total allowable living expense for transportation, the
nationwide ﬁgures for monthly ownership costs and monthly operating costs for a speciﬁed region are needed. Figure 4 reports the total
allowable living expenses for transportation.
Housing and Utilities Allowable Living Expenses

Information about local standards for housing and utilities can
be found on the IRS Web site (www.irs.gov/businesses/small/
article/0,,id=104696,00.html) and the U.S. Trustee Program Web
site (www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/meanstesting.htm).
The housing and utilities standards are published by the IRS by
state, county, and family size. For the purposes of the bankruptcy
forms, the housing and utilities standards are provided in two
components—nonmortgage expenses and mortgage/rent expenses.
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Figure 5: Total Housing and Utilities Allowable Living Expenses
Family size
State/County
California/Orange County

One or two
persons

Three persons

Four or more
persons

$1,819

$2,141

$2,462

New York/Queens County

$1,689

$1,987

$2,285

Utah/Salt Lake County

$1,237

$1,456

$1,674

Texas/Harris County

$1,122

$1,320

$1,518

Florida/Hillsborough County

$1,096

$1,289

$1,483

Source: www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/20070201/meanstesting.htm.

Figure 5 shows the total housing and utilities expenses for speciﬁed
states and counties.

Bankruptcy Exemptions by State
New York

New York debtors may only choose from the state bankruptcy
exemptions. New York provides a small homestead exemption, does
not give annuities any meaningful protection, and makes it hard to
protect life insurance.
The New York homestead exemption is limited to $25,000 for a
single person. A couple may claim the homestead exemption limit of
$50,000.
The list of exempt property in New York and the extent to which it
is exempt is found in the New York State Debtor and Creditor Law.
The debtor can protect $2,500 in household goods and all stoves,
food, and necessary fuel for 60 days; one sewing machine; the family
Bible, family pictures, and school books; other books not exceeding
$50 in value; church pew; certain domestic animals not to exceed
$450; clothing; household furniture; one refrigerator; one radio
receiver; one television set; crockery, tableware, and cooking utensils;
a wedding ring; and a watch not exceeding $35 in value.
In addition, all the necessary tools, furniture, and equipment for a
trade or business not exceeding $600 in value are exempt.
The debtor can keep one motor vehicle not exceeding $2,400
($4,800 for couples) and can protect $2,500 in cash, but not if
claiming a homestead exemption.
New York State bankruptcy law has no speciﬁc earnings exemption. An annuity is exempt to the extent determined by the court
that it is needed for the reasonable requirements of the debtor and
the debtor’s dependents. The cash surrender value of a life insurance
policy is protected from the policy owner’s creditors.
17

Texas

Texas residents may choose from either the state or federal bankruptcy exemptions. Texas is a debtor-friendly state, having expansive
and unlimited exemptions for homestead, life insurance policies and
their cash value, and annuities. Additionally, Article 16, Section 28
of the Texas state constitution bans the garnishment of wages, except
for child or spousal support.
The homestead exemption value is unlimited. The exemption is limited to 10 acres in a city or town or 100 acres (200 acres for families)
elsewhere; sale proceeds are exempt for six months after the sale.
However, the new bankruptcy legislation caps the unlimited homestead exemption at $125,000 if the homestead property is acquired
within 1,215 days of ﬁling the bankruptcy petition.
The debtor in Texas may also exempt personal property up to
$30,000 in value. Exempt personal property includes family heirlooms; sporting equipment; two ﬁrearms; one automobile per driver
in the family; two horses, mules, or donkeys; 12 head of cattle; 60
head of other livestock; 120 fowl; pets; oﬃce furnishing and supplies
used in a trade or profession; and wearing apparel.
All vehicles with two, three, or four wheels, including automobiles,
trucks, trailers, and tractors, are exempt for each qualiﬁed family
member. The debtor can also keep all farming or ranching vehicles,
tools, equipment (including boat and motor vehicle equipment), and
books used in a trade or profession.
Utah

Utah debtors may only choose from the state bankruptcy exemptions. Utah’s statutory creditor exemptions have very little protection
for real estate, and only moderate protection for properly structured
life insurance arrangements.
Real property or a mobile home used as residence or water rights up
to $10,000 may be claimed as a state exemption. If the property is
jointly owned, then each debtor can claim the exemption, but the
total joint exemption cannot exceed $20,000.
The following personal property is exempt according to the Utah
bankruptcy law: burial plot; all health aids; washer and dryer; refrigerator, freezer, stove, and microwave oven; one sewing machine; all
carpeting; provisions suﬃcient for 12 months; all clothing; all beds
and bedding; and $3,500 in implements, books, and tools of trade.
An individual is entitled to an exemption of the following property
up to a total value of $2,000 ($4,000 per couple): sofas, chairs, dining and kitchen tables, and related furnishings reasonably necessary
for one household; animals; books; heirlooms; and other items of
particular sentimental value to the individual.
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Life insurance proceeds are exempt, if the beneﬁciary is the insured’s
spouse or dependent.
Each individual is entitled to an exemption for one motor vehicle
not exceeding $2,500 in value. If ﬁling jointly and the spouses share
one vehicle, each spouse can assert the vehicle exemption against
the same vehicle. If the equity in the vehicle shared is not more than
$5,000, it is protected from bankruptcy. The vehicle exemption is
applicable to motorcycles if the motorcycle is the debtor’s primary
means of transportation.
Florida

The state of Florida has opted out of all federal laws on exemptions.
Florida debtors may only choose the state bankruptcy exemptions.
Florida bankruptcy law heavily favors debtors. According to Florida
bankruptcy proceedings, you can keep more of your personal property
during a bankruptcy than in any other state. Florida’s state constitution
provides unlimited protection to homesteaded property for persons
who have established residency there. The homestead exemption is
limited to a half-acre tract within a city and 160 contiguous acres
elsewhere.
For this reason, a Florida resident who has a $100,000 home with
no mortgage may ﬁle Chapter 7, discharge debts, and emerge from
bankruptcy with full ownership of this $100,000 home, free of any
claims of creditors. However, a New York resident in the same situation would lose the house, since New York law limits a homestead
exemption to $50,000.
However, the new Bankruptcy Act limits the homestead exemption to $125,000 for homestead interests that are acquired within a
1,215-day period (three years and four months) prior to the ﬁling of
the bankruptcy petition.
The state of Florida provides near total protection for the cash value
of life insurance policies and annuities. The debtor can exempt any
personal property up to $1,000 (a husband and wife may double
this) and a motor vehicle up to $1,000.
California

California has opted out of the use of the federal bankruptcy exemptions and provides its citizens the choice of the state exemptions.
California has two bankruptcy exemption systems. The debtor must
choose one set of exemptions; one cannot pick one exemption from
one system and another from the other system. If spouses ﬁle a joint
case, they must select an exemption system jointly; they can’t each
select a separate system. Spouses do not get to double the exemptions.
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California Statutory Creditor Exemptions: System 1
Compared to System 2, System 1 includes a generous exemption
for equity in the debtor’s residence. The homestead exemption limit
is $50,000 in California for a single person; $75,000 for a couple;
$150,000 for those who are 65 or older or physically or mentally disabled; and $100,000 for those who are 55 or older and who are single
and earn less than $15,000, or are married and earn less than $20,000.
insurance-based household income
• Disability or health beneﬁts.
• Fraternal unemployment bonds.
• A life insurance proceeds or avails if clause prohibits proceeds
from being used to pay beneﬁciary’s creditors.
• Fidelity bonds.
• Homeowners’ insurance proceeds for six months after received, to
a maximum of the homestead exemption amount.
• Matured life insurance beneﬁts needed for support.
• Unmatured life insurance policy loan value up to $10,775 for a
single person and $21,550 for a couple.
According to System 1 the debtor can keep an unlimited number of
ordinary and necessary household goods; $6,750 in jewelry; $2,550
motor vehicle; $6,750 in tools of trade per debtor, $13,475 if used
by both spouses in the same occupation; unlimited retirement beneﬁts; and 75% of wages paid within 30 days of ﬁling for bankruptcy.
California Statutory Creditor Exemptions: System 2
The homestead exemption limit for real or personal property, including co-ops used as a residence, is $20,725. The unused portion of the
homestead may be applied to any property.
insurance-based household income
• Disability or health beneﬁts.
• Life insurance proceeds or avails needed for support.
• Unmatured life insurance contract accrued avails to $11,075.
• Unmatured life insurance policy other than credit.
According to System 2 the debtor can keep an unlimited number
of household and personal items worth $525 or less each; a burial
plot up to $20,725 in lieu of homestead; $1,350 in jewelry; $3,300
motor vehicle; $2,075 in tools of trade; $20,775 in personal injury
compensation payments; $1,100 of any property; and retirement
beneﬁts necessary for support.
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Figure 6: Comparison of Allowable Household Monthly Budget Expenses by Income, State of Residence,
and Size of Household
Singles/Urban

Low

Median

High

Gross income

$28,000

$63,000

$87,000

Gross monthly
income

$2,333

$5,250

$7,250

Monthly household
budget

$498

$703

$916

Monthly
expenses

Compared
to Florida’s
expenses

Expenses
above
Florida’s

Monthly
expenses

Compared
to Florida’s
expenses

Expenses
above
Florida’s

Monthly
expenses

Compared
to Florida’s
expenses

Expenses
above
Florida’s

California
One car

$897

124%

$173

$897

36%

$173

$897

33%

$173

Mortgage/Rent

$1,819

166%

$723

$1,819

72%

$723

$1,819

66%

$723

Total living expenses

$3,214

139%

$896

$3,419

136%

$896

$3,632

133%

$896

—

$82

$334

—

$334

$739

—

$739

$3,296

142%

$978

$3,753

149%

$1,230

$4,371

160%

$1,635

Estimated state
income taxes
Grand total

$82

New York
One car

$873

121%

$149

$873

35%

$149

$873

32%

$149

Mortgage/Rent

$1,689

154%

$593

$1,689

67%

$593

$1,689

62%

$593

Total living expenses

$3,060

132%

$742

$3,265

129%

$742

$3,478

127%

$742

—

$127

$327

—

$327

$464

—

$464

$3,187

137%

$869

$3,592

142%

$1,069

$3,942

144%

$1,206

$861

119%

$137

$861

34%

$137

$861

31%

$137

Mortgage/Rent

$1,237

113%

$141

$1,237

49%

$141

$1,237

45%

$141

Total living expenses

$2,596

112%

$278

$2,801

111%

$278

$3,014

110%

$278

—

$70

$225

—

$225

$362

—

$362

$2,666

115%

$348

$3,026

120%

$503

$3,376

123%

$640

$809

112%

$85

$809

32%

$85

$809

30%

$85

Mortgage/Rent

$1,122

102%

$26

$1,122

44%

$26

$1,122

41%

$26

Total living expenses

$2,429

105%

$111

$2,634

104%

$111

$2,847

104%

$111

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

$2,429

105%

$111

$2,634

104%

$2,847

104%

$111

Estimated state
income taxes
Grand total

$127

Utah
One car

Estimated state
income taxes
Grand total

$70

Texas
One car

Estimated state
income taxes
Grand total

—
$111

—

Florida
One car

$724

100%

—

$724

100%

—

$724

100%

—

Mortgage/Rent

$1,096

100%

—

$1,096

100%

—

$1,096

100%

—

Total living expenses

$2,318

100%

—

$2,523

100%

—

$2,736

100%

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

$2,318

100%

—

$2,523

100%

—

$2,736

100%

—

Estimated state
income taxes
Grand total
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Figure 6: Comparison of Allowable Household Monthly Budget Expenses by Income, State of Residence,
and Size of Household (continued)
Families/Urban

Low (2+2)

Median (2+2)

High (2+2)

Gross income

$48,000

$91,000

$136,000

Gross monthly
income

$4,000

$7,583

$11,333

Monthly household
budget

$1,063

$1,546

$1,546

Monthly
expenses

Compared
to Florida’s
expenses

2 Cars

$1,311

181%

Mortgage/Rent

$1,888

Total living expenses

$4,262

Expenses
above
Florida’s

Monthly
expenses

Compared
to Florida’s
expenses

$587

$1,311

52%

172%

$792

$1,888

184%

$1,944

$4,745

$217

$551

Expenses
above
Florida’s

Monthly
expenses

Compared
to Florida’s
expenses

Expenses
above
Florida’s

$587

$1,311

48%

$587

75%

$792

$1,888

69%

$792

188%

$2,222

$4,745

173%

$2,009

$551

$899

California

Estimated state
income taxes

$217

Grand total

—

—

—

$899

$4,479

139%

$1,256

$5,296

143%

$1,590

$5,644

152%

$1,938

2 Cars

$1,287

178%

$563

$1,287

51%

$563

$1,287

47%

$563

Mortgage/Rent

$1,653

151%

$557

$1,653

66%

$557

$1,653

60%

$557

Total living expenses

$4,003

173%

$1,685

$4,486

178%

$1,963

$4,486

164%

$1,750

$241

$486

$486

$759

New York

Estimated state
income taxes

$241

Grand total

—

—

—

$759

$4,244

132%

$1,021

$4,972

134%

$1,266

$5,245

142%

$1,539

2 Cars

$1,276

176%

$552

$1,276

51%

$552

$1,276

47%

$552

Mortgage/Rent

$1,285

117%

$189

$1,285

51%

$189

$1,285

47%

$189

Total living expenses

$3,624

156%

$1,306

$4,107

163%

$1,584

$4,107

150%

$1,371

—

$112

$278

—

$278

$503

$3,736

116%

$513

$4,385

118%

$679

2 Cars

$1,223

169%

$499

$1,223

48%

Mortgage/Rent

$1,012

92%

–$84

$1,012

Total living expenses

$3,298

142%

$980

$3,781

—

—

—

—

$3,298

102%

$3,781

102%

2 Cars

$1,139

100%

—

$1,139

100%

Mortgage/Rent

$1,021

100%

—

$1,021

100%

Total living expenses

$3,223

100%

—

$3,706

—

—

—

—

$3,223

100%

—

$3,706

Utah

Estimated state
income taxes

$112

Grand total

—

$503

$4,610

124%

$904

$499

$1,223

45%

$499

40%

–$84

$1,012

37%

–$84

150%

$1,258

$3,781

138%

$1,045

—

—

—

—

$3,781

102%

—

$1,139

100%

—

—

$1,021

100%

—

100%

—

$3,706

100%

—

—

—

—

—

—

100%

—

$3,706

100%

—

Texas

Estimated state
income taxes
Grand total

—
$75

$75

$75

Florida

Estimated state
income taxes
Grand total
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